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Andrew M. Engelhardt 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This thesis examines what circumstances compel individuals to take policy preferences in 
line with their objective self-interest. In particular, I argue that social class plays an 
important role in shaping individuals’ policy preferences. Whereas recent work in 
political science has examined social class from the perspective of socioeconomic status, 
I contend that conceptualizing social class as a group identity plays an important 
complementary role. I show that social class identification has a statistically and 
substantively significant effect—comparable to changes in partisanship, ideology, and 
income—on individuals’ preferences for a policy related to their economic situation. 
Ignoring social class identification when evaluating class effects prevents us from fully 
understanding individuals’ preferences, a weakness especially consequential amidst 
concerns about politicians’ responsiveness to low-income people. 
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With chants of “We are the 99%!” and “Banks got bailed out! We got sold out!” filling the 
unseasonably warm autumnal air, New York City’s Zucotti Park quickly drew the attention of 
individuals both domestically and abroad. Beginning September 25, 2011, Occupy Wall Street 
(OWS) soon had offshoots nationwide. These often multi-day protests involved protestors 
coming together in public spaces, often establishing semi-permanent camps and creating working 
groups that handled tasks as diverse as food distribution and public outreach (Milkman, Luce, 
and Lewis 2013). While some considered the “occupying” of Zucotti Park a spontaneous act, it 
had been organized to an extent by the anti-consumerist Canadian magazine Adbusters (Sommer 
2012). To a degree Occupy mimicked that year’s large-scale public protests collectively known 
as the Arab Spring; many Occupy activists participated in these protests before coming to New 
York (Milkman, Luce, and Lewis 2013). Other participants were influenced by the protests in 
Madison, Wisconsin, that resulted from Republican attempts to eliminate collective bargaining 
rights for the state’s public employees. Occupy concluded a rather eventful year of public protest 
activity. 
In addition to the uniqueness of its methods, OWS was distinct in that it lacked any 
unifying demands or clear goals. Some “Occupiers” decried government policies they saw as 
improving the lot of corporations and high-income individuals (Milkman, Luce, and Lewis 
2013). Others highlighted the burdens of student debt, which were compounded by limited 
employment opportunities. Soon, many credited Occupy with elevating economic inequality as a 
topic of political discussion (Deprez and Dodge 2011, Milkman, Luce, and Lewis 2013).   
While Occupy Wall Street was a recent political event, the economic phenomena the 
movement highlighted had been occurring for years. The key point brought forth by Occupy 
centered on the ever-increasing disparity in incomes and wealth between different sections of 
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society. Not only was the top income quintile pulling away from the bottom quintiles, the top 
10% gained even more. Most astonishingly, even within the top 10%—the group’s lowest 
income was $98,955 in 2007—the top 1% performed the best. Between 1979 and 2007, the share 
of market income going to this group rose from 10 percent to 20 percent. Its after-tax share 
similarly doubled, from 8 percent to 17 percent (Congressional Budget Office 2011). In contrast, 
the middle three income quintiles each saw their share of after-tax income drop 2 to 3 percentage 
points. 
That same fall, in a speech in Osawatomie, Kansas, President Barack Obama echoed the 
themes articulated by Occupy: 
 
“[F]or most Americans, the basic bargain that made this country great has eroded. Long 
before the recession hit, hard work stopped paying off for too many people. Fewer and 
fewer of the folks who contributed to the success of our economy actually benefited from 
that success. Those at the very top grew wealthier from their incomes and their 
investments—wealthier than ever before. But everybody else struggled with costs that 
were growing and paychecks that weren’t—and too many families found themselves 
racking up more and more debt just to keep up” (The White House 2011). 
 
 
The Great Recession that began in December 2007 placed economic performance at or 
near the top of many individuals’ concerns. A 2010 survey conducted by the Pew Research 
Center showed that a majority of all adults in the labor force had experienced some work-related 
hardship (Taylor et al. 2010). Thirty-two percent of respondents were either currently 
unemployed or had experienced a period without a job since the recession began. Among the 
employed, over 20% either had their work hours decreased or experienced a pay cut. Occurring 
alongside broader trends including long-term wage stagnation and increasing disparities in 
compensation between employees and CEOs (Mishel et al. 2012, Ch. 4), the climate surrounding 
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the Great Recession suggested that economic considerations offered a significant point of 
concern for individuals. 
Intriguingly, Occupy lacked the diversity one might expect given the consequences of 
these economic phenomena. Some 80% of the Occupy activists in New York City had a 
bachelor’s degree and about 36% had incomes over $100,000 (Milkman, Luce, and Lewis 2013). 
Moreover, about two-thirds of those involved were white. The movement could not speak, 
therefore, to any universal class or racial inclusion. With arguments explicating the stark increase 
in inequality over the last few decades, why would these relatively better off individuals be 
concerned with their economic situation? Some identify the typical Occupy activist as a member 
of the “precariate”—educated individuals with limited job prospects (Moynihan 2013). What 
remains puzzling is the limited participation by those enduring more long-term disadvantage 
(Koch 1994, 689). Occupy was not the mass proletarian uprising some on the right considered it 
to be (Boxer 2011). 
This puzzle—why relatively advantaged individuals participated in greater numbers in a 
movement addressing economic inequality and a lack of economic opportunity—motivates my 
thesis. Understanding why lower-income individuals didn’t participate en masse is important if 
one wants to fully grasp the nature of a movement concerned with broad distributional questions. 
Most immediately, understanding the factors potentially influencing an individual’s policy 
preferences would provide some initial idea as to what may differentiate participants and 
nonparticipants in a movement like Occupy. If one individual’s preferred policy goals are 
advanced by Occupy and another person’s are not, then one may reasonably expect the former 
actor to participate and the latter to not. 
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Given the prevalence of economic issues in the United States, exploring the role social 
class plays in shaping individuals’ policy preferences should shed light on why individuals 
support certain policies over others. Social class, as with other group identifications, influences 
identifiers’ perceptions and attitudes toward social and political events (Conover 1984). The 
process through which class-based perceptions affect the attitudes that class identifiers hold 
remains understudied. Understanding policy differences between different social classes might 
explain class-based behavior and add nuance to the substantial literature on social cleavages. 
Determining which factors affect the policy preferences held by identifiers of different 
social classes can improve our comprehension of how social class influences public policy. This 
understanding becomes more important in an environment of increasing inequality and 
decreasing social mobility (Congressional Budget Office 2011). These factors disadvantage 
certain groups in society and advantage others; however, it is not self-evident that classes would 
deviate from one another on important issues. The possibility also exists that in an environment 
of inequality members of disadvantaged social strata may develop policy preferences that would 
help not only themselves but also those in other objectively disadvantaged groups. A better 
understanding of what policy attitudes class identifiers hold, and what other factors may mitigate 
the relationship between identification and preferences, may provide a clearer picture of policy 
outcomes. 
 In this thesis I argue that social class matters in American politics, particularly because of 
its role in shaping individuals’ attitudes. I start by discussing the role of social class in American 
politics. I highlight arguments about whether class matters and, if it does, how significant its 
effects are. After demonstrating that objective class does matter, I then propose an alternative 
conception of social class that contains the key difference between my approach and the other 
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literature in political science. Instead of considering class as socioeconomic status alone, I draw 
from the literature on group identification to show how social class can function as a group 
identity. I argue that identifying with a social class group produces policy preferences in line 
with individuals’ “objective” self-interest; these preferences may be mitigated by other factors at 
the individual or system level. Since group identification suggests feelings of interdependence 
and a collective orientation (Miller et al. 1981), something implied by a movement like Occupy, 
a group identification perspective seems important for more completely explaining individuals’ 
preferences. 
To test the relationship between class identification and attitudes I use data from the 2000 
General Social Survey. While I would prefer a fielding closer to the Great Recession, I use the 
2000 data set because of year-specific question modules. In the analysis section I establish 
relationships between class identification and policies tied to self-interest. Next, I discuss factors 
differentiating the working class from the middle class and highlight how these differences vary 
by level of income. I then test a full model for the influence of social class on policy preferences, 
accounting for typically strong explanatory factors like partisanship and ideology. I find a 
statistically significant and substantively meaningful difference between middle and working 
class identifiers in the probability that they agree with a relevant policy proposal: government 
should reduce income differences between low- and high-income individuals. The effect of class 
identification was comparable to reasonable changes in ideology, partisanship, and objective 
class membership. I conclude with a discussion of the implications from the approach and offer 
suggestions for further research. 
 
Class in American Politics 
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Class has been an analytical point of investigation since Marx. Exploring the role of social class 
in the United States is especially important in the current environment of increasing economic 
inequality. For instance, class may influence individuals’ attitudes. To the degree that class 
matters in this regard, those in different classes should think differently about social and political 
issues. According to Michael Hout (2010), social class helps Americans orient themselves within 
society and constrains their behavior, interests, and attitudes. These constraints may increase the 
probability individuals hold attitudes that benefit their objective self-interest. Moreover, this 
class influence may matter in both the short- and long-term. In fact, studies of socially mobile 
individuals have shown that preferences tied to their class of origin persist over time (De Graaf et 
al. 1995). The persistence of class influence suggests that understanding how social class shapes 
individuals’ attitudes has both an immediate and lasting importance. 
Some contend that class has a negligible role in American politics (see generally McCall 
and Manza 2010; Roemer 1998). Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas? offers 
perhaps the best-known treatment of this topic. According to Frank and others, “the class basis 
New Deal voting patterns had given way to a new cleavage structure in which conservative 
ideology and cultural issues brought large numbers of working-class whites into the Republican 
camp” (Bartels 2006, 203). Working class individuals have abandoned the Democratic Party for 
the Republican Party as they change their focus from personal financial concerns to social and 
moral issues. Broadly, this argument concludes that ideological polarization on social and 
cultural issues better defines the contemporary political landscape than differences on economic 
policy (McCall and Manza 2010).  
Others have argued instead that class remains an important influence on both vote choice 
and party identification (Bartels 2008; Brewer and Stonecash 2007; Manza and Brooks 2008; 
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McCarty et al. 2008). Beyond the vote and partisanship, if we examine policy preferences 
between class groups we should see class differences in policy areas related to feelings of self-
interest. Even so, some contend that the magnitude of income-based differences is actually small; 
therefore, class differences may exist but be insubstantial. Joseph Ura and Christopher Ellis 
(2008) argue that, over time, “policy mood” differs across income quartiles with wealthier 
individuals usually more conservative than poorer individuals. They also find, however, that the 
relationship lacks consistency, as differences in mood between the rich and poor are statistically 
indistinguishable in roughly half of the years they consider.  
A potentially significant shortcoming in these current treatments of class follows from 
how these scholars operationalize this subject. Most of the analyses arguing that class still 
matters use measures of socioeconomic status—usually income—as indicators of class. While 
education and income levels do matter, they mainly indicate an individual’s position in society in 
terms of resources. They do not take into account the possibility that individuals of a certain 
socioeconomic status feel similar to others in comparable positions. Consequently, I aim to 
modify and extend these “class matters” stories by proposing a definition of class as a social 
group. Outside of the race and ethnic politics literature there has been an incomplete discussion 
on the effects groups have on the attitudes and policy preferences for individuals identifying with 
them. I hope to fill in this gap by examining social class as a group identity.  
The importance of differences in preferences between classes is especially significant 
when considering the representation of various groups in Congress. On the one hand, Ura and 
Ellis (2008) contend that the preferences of wealthier citizens are not more predictive of 
Congressional policymaking. On the other hand, Martin Gilens (2012) and Larry Bartels (2008) 
argue that the poor are in fact poorly represented in Congress. If this is the case, and if, as some 
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contend, large preference gaps exist between the rich and poor in policy areas as diverse as social 
welfare, taxes, and national security (Gilens 2009), then policies enacted will be unfairly skewed 
to benefit the wealthy and others in privileged positions. Understanding the process through 
which social class influences policy preferences therefore becomes important for evaluating the 
democratic responsiveness of political institutions. Moreover, if class identification promotes the 
assumption of self-interested policy preferences, then understanding when this effect exists or 
changes in degrees would further improve these evaluations. Extensions could also help us 
understand why, for example, Occupy Wall Street was not a more broadly inclusive movement 
between class groups. To begin untangling the class influence process, the following section 
draws together lessons from the literature on group identification to understand the consequences 
for analyzing class as a social group. 
 
Class and Group Identity 
Broadly speaking, people can identify with any number of groups. These groups could form 
around shared characteristics like gender, race, age, or occupation. Identifying with a group 
follows from an awareness of the group as a social entity (Brewer 2001; Lau 1989). In the case 
of social class, individuals would see the working class or middle class as collections of 
individuals sharing similar objective characteristics; perhaps they work in a similar job or earn 
comparable amounts of money. Identifying with a group signifies a psychological attachment to 
the group as a social entity; individuals may perceive themselves as members of a common 
social category even without sharing objective traits (Conover 1984, 1988; Koch 1993; Lau 
1989). This psychological, or affective, attachment compels individuals to feel more positively 
about those also identifying with the group since they share similar traits and are part of the same 
“team.”  
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How individuals select the groups they identify with follows from a variety of factors. 
Lau (1989) argues that similarity to others identifying with a group, the group’s political 
salience, and the proportion of group identifiers in a local environment all contribute to the 
likelihood individuals will subsequently identify with the group. A group’s place in society also 
plays an important role as the political and social contexts influence group identification by 
affecting the group’s political salience (Conover 1984, Koch 1994, Lau 1989). A more highly 
salient group identity will increase the likelihood someone identifies with the group. Individuals 
may also show a greater willingness to identify with higher-status groups than lower-status 
groups (Koch 1994). Regardless of their objective circumstances, individuals would then rather 
identify as middle class than working class or lower class given the connotations associated with 
each group. This would especially be the case if opinion leaders referred to middle class 
concerns, perhaps generically referring to improving the situation of America’s middle class 
families, thereby increasing the salience of middle class identification. 
Group identification is often defined as comprising two components: objective group 
membership and a psychological attachment to the group, or subjective identification (Conover 
1984, 1988). In the context of social class, similar levels of education or income would place 
individuals objectively in one class group over another given their access to resources. From this 
objective position the individual could then identify with a relevant class group. An individual 
with a bachelor’s degree who earns $65,000 a year as a chemist would probably be considered 
middle class. She would then use these objective factors, her income and degree, to identify the 
class group with which to identify. Conover (1984) notes that while objective group membership 
may not have a substantial impact on political perceptions and attitudes, subjective group 
identification does. 
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Identifying with a group has consequences for an individual’s political behavior and 
attitudes. For instance, Lau (1989) argues, “Merely the perception that one is part of a group (and 
that other people are not part of the group) is sufficient for people to act differentially toward in-
group and out-group members” (220). Those identifying with a group pay attention to things 
explicitly linked to the group’s economic and social interests, providing various interpretations 
of the political environment. Some argue, then, that identification fosters a sense of solidarity 
with the group and its interests (Conover 1984). For example, individuals identifying as working 
class may take policy positions that protect collective bargaining rights and others that promote 
employment while middle class individuals may show more support for policies controlling 
inflation. 
 Others contend that group identification does not directly translate into group influence 
without the development of a group consciousness; identifiers develop a sense that their group 
and another group hold opposite issue positions (Miller et al. 1981, Conover 1988). A group 
consciousness, then, combines group identification with a “political awareness or ideology 
regarding the group’s relative position in society along with a commitment to collective action 
aimed at realizing the group’s interests” (Miller et al. 1981, 495). In other words, some external 
factors make identification with a group politically salient for objective members (see also 
Converse and Campbell 1968). It may be that political elites frame a certain policy option as 
benefiting a specific class group. Consequently, those identifying with this group may look more 
favorably upon the policy proposal because their class identification has become more salient. 
 Amidst a sense of interdependence and a developing group consciousness, group 
identification promotes the formation of self-interested attitudes targeted at enhancing the 
group’s position. For example, lower class individuals might perceive an inability to remedy 
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their disadvantaged position by themselves. They may believe the existing social order to be 
illegitimate due to perceptions of its distributional unfairness. This perceived unfairness may 
encourage concerns that those in deprived groups have less control of their own fate than do their 
counterparts in privileged groups. The interests of lower or working class individuals may run 
opposite those of middle or higher class individuals, with implications for policy and democratic 
responsiveness. 
The degree to which group identification influences individuals’ attitudes and behaviors 
follows from the legitimacy of an existing state of affairs. Individuals assign legitimacy 
according to who or what they blame for the status quo arrangements—either individual failings 
or inequities in the social system (Miller et al. 1981). Working class individuals who face 
diminishing retirement benefits through employers restructuring pensions may become more 
supportive of increased spending on Social Security as a way to balance this effect. Lower class 
individuals without a college degree may support public provision of job training programs to 
improve their chances at securing employment. Blaming outside factors rather than faulting 
individuals for existing inequalities may increase the degree to which group identification affects 
attitudes by encouraging the formation of a group consciousness. In contrast, locating solutions 
to problems at the personal rather than collective level may decrease the influence of group 
identification. Individual blame has been shown to inhibit voter turnout and affect evaluations of 
presidential candidates, indicating that the placement of blame has significant consequences 
(Brody and Sniderman 1977, Abramowitz et al. 1988, cf. Arceneaux 2003). 
When considering those identifying with an advantaged group, this group identity would 
promote the benefits that accrue to them. Gurin and colleagues (1980) argue that group 
consciousness for those high in status, power, or resources justifies advantage and has the aim of 
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maintaining beneficial arrangements. They suggest that group consciousness justifying the status 
quo would likely occur if disadvantaged groups attacked this “natural state of affairs” (Gurin et 
al. 1980, 34). Upper class identifiers benefiting from the carried interest treatment of investment 
income may ardently oppose proposals to increase the tax rate on long-term capital gains. More 
broadly, they may oppose any increase in taxes as this would potentially threaten the well-being 
of themselves and their peers. Those identifying with advantaged groups realize that their 
preferences are opposed to other, potentially disadvantaged, groups, and want to ensure that the 
can continue to enjoy their current benefits. 
In contrast, identifying with a group on the opposite end of the distributional 
arrangements encourages policies that would ameliorate this disadvantage. Disadvantaged 
groups question the rules governing the distribution of status, power, and resources in society 
because these rules are opposed to identifiers’ interests (Gurin et al. 1980, see also Miller et al. 
1981). This questioning, combined with a salient group identity, compels group identifiers to 
think collectively. The focus on a collective orientation is important because it emphasizes the 
perception that the issues facing the group exist beyond the capacity for any single member of 
the group to solve. Thus, politics becomes the locus of engagement for the group as identifiers 
view government action as the best, perhaps only, method for mediating perceived distributional 
illegitimacies (see generally Page and Jacobs 2009). Only the government has the tools to 
redistribute incomes from upper-income, upper class individuals to lower-income, lower class 
individuals, thereby smoothing market outcomes. 
Group identification, via a group consciousness, makes outcomes relevant to the group 
personally significant for the individual. Conover’s (1988) characterization of group 
consciousness in particular focuses on a configuration of affective and cognitive elements that 
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lead individuals to feel sympathetic towards their in-group, contributing to the development of 
pro-group issue positions (see also Kinder and Kam 2010). The realization of a group 
consciousness among deprived individuals could result from a shift in accepting the status quo to 
instead questioning why an out-group possesses greater, or unfair amounts of, resources, status, 
or power. This questioning attributes the group’s relatively deprived status to forces external to it 
and produces a sense of anger regarding those forces (Conover 1988). Concurrently, an assault 
on the status quo could mobilize dominant groups to participate in politics out of a desire to 
maintain the existing relationships (Miller et al. 1981). The development of a group 
consciousness, again, entails a specific group identity becoming politically salient for an 
identifier through a realization that the group’s interests may be opposed to those of another 
group. 
 
Orienting the Argument 
Following the previous discussion, I argue that individuals who identify with a specific social 
class will broadly share policy preferences, especially in comparison to those identifying with 
other classes. Moreover, given the personal economic situation class identification entails, I 
hypothesize that policy areas most clearly linked to identifiers’ self-interest should exhibit class 
effects. For instance, class identification should matter for attitudes about taxes, spending on aid 
to the poor, or wanting the government to reduce income differences between high- and low-
income people, but not for gun control, capital punishment, or marijuana legalization. 
The typical model for the effect of social class on policy preferences or vote choice 
reduces to the following: 
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In contrast, I include factors in between what would be a measure of socioeconomic 
status and the outcome of interest. As described earlier, I propose a conception of class as a 
social group. Identification with a class group therefore comes between objective group 
membership—indicated by socioeconomic status—and attitudes. Consequently, I model the 
process through which class helps identifiers take preferences in their objective self-interest in 
the following way: 
 
Objective 
Membership	
 Determines	

Policy Preference / 
Vote Choice	

Policy Preference!
Objective 
Membership!
Subjective 
Identification!
Mitigating 
Factors!
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Whereas most of the political science literature has focused solely on class as an 
individual’s objective position, class according to my proposed relationship above contains 
additional modifiers. Developing class as a social group implies a collective orientation, one 
where an individual’s economic position may affect the class group she identifies with. The class 
an individual identifies with, and the subsequent effect on her policy preferences, could in part 
depend on her economic circumstances; therefore, I expect the inclusion of class identification to 
decrease the magnitude of influence from objective membership as identification captures some 
of class membership’s effect. 
The discussion of group identity suggests that additional factors may influence the effect 
class identification has, especially if these factors relate to the salience of the group identity or 
the legitimacy of the social order. These factors may also differentiate identifiers both within and 
between groups. For example, in studying class politics in Chile, Langton and Rapoport (1975) 
found that to the degree that class differences existed, interacting with other individuals who 
linked their objective position with their subjective identification increased the effect of 
identification on vote choice. Moreover, they found that identifying with a class and having a 
conflict image of politics significantly increased support for Left parties. To understand whether 
similar features affect class identification’s contribution I include the mitigating factors stage. 
I specifically use the term mitigating rather than moderating or mediating for these 
factors. The terms mediating and moderating have related implications about the nature of the 
relationship between variables they are attached to and other variables being considered. 
Therefore, I adopt the term mitigating because I remain agnostic about the exact relationship 
between these factors and social class identification. Whether, for example, a conflict image 
mediates—class identification influences the perception of conflict which in turn determines the 
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effect on the dependent variable—or moderates—class identification’s effect depends on the 
degree of conflict perceived—does not enter into the expectations for my results. 
Class identification effects on attitudes should be especially strong on policies that 
specifically target the individuals’ class: policies related to an individual’s self-interest as 
determined by their objective economic situation. Beyond identifying with a group, an identifier 
must see a relationship between the group and politics (Converse and Campbell 1968). For group 
identification to matter, identifiers may believe that the distributional order is illegitimate and 
that government action is therefore necessary, and able, to correct these imbalances, which 
makes salient the identification with the group during attitude formation. As connections 
between a group’s position and policy outcomes become clearer in identifiers’ minds, the 
differences between identifiers of different classes should become more apparent. The degree 
that differences between class identifiers are found in this way would suggest that individuals 
find class relevant to the political context and feel their identification salient. 
While a substantial literature exists concerning the role class plays in voting behavior, 
relatively little investigation has focused on the effect class may have regarding policy 
preferences, let alone the process through which this effect emerges. Additionally, the 
measurement of class most often used in these analyses only takes into account objective 
conditions. An approach to social class that utilizes the understandings of behavior developed 
within the literature on group identification should enhance the current understanding of social 
class politics. Through an examination of factors contributing to differences between classes in 
various policy areas we can address the mechanism(s) that promote the development of these 
cleavages, sharpening our knowledge of social class in the process. 
 
Data and Methods 
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The 2000 General Social Survey (GSS) allows us to test the hypothesized relationship between 
objective class membership, class identification, and policy preferences. It allows us to examine 
these factors and evaluate what elements contribute to low-income individuals assuming policy 
positions that come in line with their objective self-interest. My indicator for objective class 
membership is the respondent’s total family income in order to capture the effect of multi-earner 
households. A more detailed discussion of why I operationalize objective class with income 
follows this section.  
To measure the subjective component of class, what I have also referred to as class 
identification, the GSS asks respondents to select which class category they identify with: lower 
class, working class, middle class, upper class. While my analysis sees subjective identification 
with a class as a central component in the formation of attitudes, a note of caution is in order. 
Due to social norms within the United States, individuals have a tendency to declare themselves 
either working class or middle class regardless of their objective circumstances. As Table 1 
indicates, 91% of respondents were rather evenly divided between the two categories. 
 
Class Identification Number Frequency 
Lower Class 142 5.07% 
Working Class 1280 45.67% 
Middle Class 1273 45.42% 
Upper Class 108 3.85% 
Total 2803 100% 
Table 1. Subjective Class Identification in the 2000 General Social Survey 
 
Bearing this limitation in mind, disaggregating class identifiers according to income and 
location in the Erikson-Goldthorpe class schema helps draw a sharper distinction between class 
groups. The Erikson-Goldthorpe schema categorizes individuals according to their employment 
situation, accounting for how they are paid and what sort of work they perform. As Figure 1 
shows, increasing levels of income correspond to decreasing levels of identification with the 
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lower and working classes. Working class identification dominates until the $50,000 mark when 
middle class identification then becomes predominant. Likewise, rising income increases 
identification with the upper class, a shift most evident in the final category. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
The picture painted by Figure 2 is more complex, but a pattern does emerge. Skilled and 
non-skilled laborers, those in working class occupational relationships, are those most likely to 
identify with the working class. Some two-thirds of these individuals identify as either working 
or lower class. In contrast, majorities of individuals in service class or self-employed 
entrepreneurs (i.e. petty bourgeoisie) positions identify as middle or upper class. 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
Both Figures 1 and 2 to some degree exhibit intracategory variation. For instance, in 
Figure 1 we see that more than 80% of the top quintile, those high-income individuals making 
more than $75,000, identify as either middle or upper class. Even so, over 20% of the top 
quintile identifies as working class. While not as apparent, of low-income individuals, those in 
the bottom two quintiles, more than 60% identify as either lower or working class. According to 
Michael Hout (2008), the intracategory variation we see comes as a consequence of what he calls 
status inconsistency. When forced to identify with a class group, he argues that these individuals 
face a difficult choice because they objectively exist in more than one category. Hout offers the 
following as a reason for the split between working and middle class identifiers: 
 
“[T]he nearly even split of Americans into the middle and working classes reflects the 
balance of consistently high and consistently low status class locations, ambivalence 
stemming from status inconsistency, and ambiguity about the borderline that separates 
the working class from the middle class among people like high school graduates with 
average incomes and routine jobs who might fall on either side of the line” (2008, 40). 
	   21	  
 
Americans emphasize additional criteria when determining their class locations as well, 
including: homeownership, union membership, marriage, and leisure pursuits. According to Hout 
(2008), if someone uses a longer list of requirements to determine a social class with which to 
identify, then the likelihood that she suffers from status inconsistency will increase, although this 
need not necessarily be realized. Different understandings about what objectively makes 
someone working or middle class would therefore complicate how an individual comes to 
identify with a specific class group. Even so, if significant differences in policy preferences do 
exist between working and middle class identifiers, then we might expect even stronger 
differences if individuals held clearer understandings of the criteria differentiating class groups. 
The General Social Survey has additional variables useful for exploring what factors help 
individuals take policy positions in line with their self-interest. The GSS asks respondents a 
series of questions that fall within my classification of mitigating variables—those factors that 
when included alongside class identification in some way influence the relationship between 
class and policy preferences. For example, in 2000 the GSS asked a subsample of respondents a 
battery of questions about their perceptions of social conflict as well as a battery of questions 
asking respondents about their attitudes regarding inequality—who it benefits, why it exists—
that are useful for examining the connection between system-oriented perceptions and group 
identification. Similarly, several questions tap individuals’ feelings about their relative position 
in society, providing the opportunity to evaluate whether perceptions of relative disadvantage 
clarify differences between class identifiers. Below I describe more fully how these mitigating 
variables differentiate class identifiers.  
Finally, the GSS offers plenty of variation for dependent variables. Following my 
assumption of self-interested preference orientations I expect class identification to have the 
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most relevance to policies concerning the distribution of resources. I compare the differences 
between identifiers on these policy issues to attitudes supporting the legalization of marijuana, 
capital punishment in the event of murder, and background checks for the purchase of guns. I do 
not expect significant class differences in these areas because they lack a direct relationship with 
individuals’ material circumstances. While I contrast the relationships between identification for 
self-interest and non self-interest related policies, my primary dependent variable of interest asks 
respondents whether or not they agree that the government should reduce income differences 
between low- and high-income individuals. 
 The analysis proceeds in four steps. First, following the lead of the group identity 
literature I establish a definition for objective class membership, specifically what makes 
someone objectively working class. This definition is important because, as the group 
identification literature notes, individuals with certain objective characteristics will be more 
likely to identify with groups these characteristics relate to. Next, I describe the results from 
various cross-tabulations to show that preferences do vary by class identification for policies 
related to an individual’s objective circumstances. Then, in the same way I show how class 
identification varies given various mitigating factors, such as job security, change in financial 
status, and attitudes about one’s relative economic standing. Finally, I combine these two 
exercises to evaluate the effect of class identification on policy preferences while controlling for 
demographic factors, partisanship, and ideology. I contrast the results from my model of class 
identification with the model typically used to show class effects, and show that merely using 
objective class ignores an important contribution made by class identification. Likewise, I show 
that including factors explaining intergroup variation in class identification may help show when 
class identification’s effect should be most apparent. 
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What is Objective Class? 
As the discussion on group identity noted, identification involves feeling psychologically 
attached to a group and sharing similar objective circumstances with other identifiers. While we 
have an existing measure of subjective identification, we do not yet have a measure of objective 
class. Consequently, before we can examine how social class identification influences 
individuals’ policy preferences we must establish criteria for objective class membership to 
evaluate whether class identification has different effects for those objectively in a specific class 
group. 
Objective definitions of class concern how much money people have, what they do with 
their money, or how they earn their money (Hout 2010). What people do with their money falls 
into aspects of lifestyle. Some consider this conception important as it indicates individuals’ 
orientations to social life and how these predispose some classes to one lifestyle and other 
classes to other modes of living (Hout 2010). While class may structure social interactions, the 
inability to fully capture these effects from a measurement standpoint limits the possibility of 
applying the lifestyle perspective to evaluations of individuals’ participation or attitudes. 
For political scientists, the most commonly used measures to indicate individuals’ 
objective class status have been income and education, the typical measures of socioeconomic 
status. These measures attempt to tap one’s current economic state and future earnings potential, 
or, to meld it into the previous discussion, the amount of resources available to an individual1. 
Resource access, either current or future, becomes important when one considers the different 
economic decisions high- and low-income individuals make.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  An individual’s total wealth would provide an even clearer economic position; however, the General Social 
Survey does not contain a measure of wealth and therefore makes the use of wealth as an objective indicator more 
problematic. 
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One could also define objective class membership by using occupation. Sociologists 
often look at occupation from the perspective of employment relations (see Erikson and 
Goldthorpe 1992, Svallfors 2006). This takes into account the human capital requirements and 
monetary rewards for a job, thus potentially accounting for both education and income (McCall 
and Manza 2010)2. Alternatively, one could use occupational prestige scores. These scores are 
taken from evaluations of occupational status provided by survey respondents (Hauser and 
Warren 1997)3. 
In determining a sound theoretical conception of objective class that takes into account 
both the amount of money people earn and how they make it, the Erikson-Goldthorpe class 
schema offers a convincing formulation. Likewise, the Duncan prestige scores provide a way to 
tap social status as indicated by one’s occupation. However, to provide the most direct 
connection to the political science frameworks within which the rest of this analysis exists, I 
establish criteria for objective membership in the working class based on level of income. Using 
income allows for an easier comparison of class effects in this analysis with other extant work in 
the discipline. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Robert Erikson and John Goldthorpe created perhaps the best-known class schema. This construction follows from 
individuals’ relationships to labor and production units. It divides people according to their status as employers, self-
employed without employees, and employees. Each category relates to the amount of control an individual has over 
her, or others’, labor. In addition, it takes into consideration the nature of individuals’ compensation, e.g. salaried or 
hourly. The employment situation and form of compensation are combined to create the class schema—creating 
categories where individuals exhibit some homogeneity in access to resources. For example, Erikson and 
Goldthorpe argue that working class positions—non-skilled and skilled labor—would most likely be paid by the 
hour rather than by a salary (1992, Ch. 2). The schema relies on a structural perspective of class—it looks at class as 
a social position based on labor market relationships.  
 3	  The Duncan Occupational Prestige scores are often used in this regard. Prestige scores have advantages in that 
they are highly correlated across countries and over time. Moreover, it does not matter who rates occupations and 
how they are asked to do so. Critics of the scores, however, argue that they lack criterion validity because they are 
not highly correlated with other measures of occupational social standing—average educational attainment and 
income of occupational incumbents (Hauser and Warren 1997, 190). 	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For the rest of the paper, those considered objectively working class have household 
incomes under $30,000 (although in regressions I will use the full range of income categories). 
In 2000, $30,000 is about 171% of the poverty line for a family of four. Using the 2000 General 
Social Survey and defining objectively working class with a $30,000 cutpoint, we have 1,048 
objectively working class individuals in the data set, over 42% of the whole sample. This aligns 
somewhat similarly to the distribution of household income in the United States in 2000, with the 
mean household in the second quintile having an income of $25,331 (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2001). 
Similarly, when compared to the Erikson-Goldthorpe class schema, large numbers in what the 
schema establishes as working class positions earned under $30,000.  
Unionized workers present obstacles for any income-based definition. Households with 
union members would typically see higher incomes, something the GSS data suggest. Likewise, 
someone in a heavily unionized occupation would benefit from unions’ presence even if she 
were not a member herself given externalities following from union bargaining for wages and 
benefits. However, when looking at income by class schema position and union membership we 
see the majority of skilled and non-skilled workers who earn more than $30,000 are also union 
members. In contrast, a clear majority of self-employed businesspeople, in the schema referred to 
as the petty bourgeoisie, earn over $30,000. A similar, if even more pronounced, difference 
exists for those categorized as part of the service class, with about 82% of these salaried 
professionals and managers earning over $30,000. While admittedly an arbitrary threshold, using 
$30,000 to establish an income level determining whether or not an individual is objectively 
working class appears to have merit with its accounting for the bottom two income quintiles in 
2000 while also producing results similar to what the use of a more detailed class schema might 
offer. 
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Analysis 
 
Class identification and policy preferences 
Through this thesis I explore the impact of social class on political attitudes. Specifically, I focus 
on the question of “under what conditions do low-income respondents take policy positions 
‘objectively’ in their self-interest.” I expect to find that income effects are largely mitigated by 
class identifications, alongside other factors like perceptions of fairness in the system and 
perceptions of conflict between classes. Examining traits that coincide with working class 
identification and income may serve to provide guidance on relevant factors in this relationship.  
As has been noted above, individuals with lower socioeconomic status as indicated by 
income or education more frequently identify as working or lower class. Yet, beyond these 
resource indicators, what other attributes characterize working class individuals? Is working 
class identification associated with subjective evaluations of individual and national financial 
situations? What differences exist between someone objectively working class who identifies as 
working class and someone who identifies as middle class? In this and subsequent sections I 
dichotomize the GSS class identification question, combining individuals identifying as lower 
class and working class into one category and those identifying with the middle or upper class 
into another category4. For the sake of brevity I will refer to these categories as working class 
and middle class, respectively. 
Before examining traits differentiating working and middle class identifiers, and how 
imposing restrictions on objective class membership affects these relationships, understanding 
how identification relates to policy preferences should suggest which policies to subsequently 
examine more in-depth. As discussed above, under a rational choice approach working class 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The combined lower and working class category consists of 1,422 respondents, with another 1,381 respondents in 
the combined middle and upper class category. This relates to 51% and 49% of the sample respectively. 
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individuals should favor more government activity, especially when these actions influence the 
allocation of resources. In contrast, policies that relate to more social and moral concerns should 
not exhibit substantial, if any, class-based differences. Policies connected to individuals’ 
economic concerns should evince class differences, while those divorced from people’s financial 
considerations should not. Initially, we can examine differences between identifiers in their “size 
of government” preferences. The GSS determines individuals’ general dispositions about which 
actors should solve public problems through the following question: “Some people think that the 
government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and 
private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve 
our country's problems.” In response, the working class favored more government intervention 
by 5 points over the middle class, 27% to 22%. 
 First, I explore whether policies related to social issues exhibit differences between class 
groups. To examine this possibility, I use questions in the General Social Survey asking 
respondents about their support for capital punishment, gun laws, and legalizing marijuana. 
Considering capital punishment, over two-thirds of each class favor the death penalty for murder, 
with the working class 1.5 percentage points more in favor. Likewise, about 82% of respondents 
from both classes support gun permits. Finally, when asked whether they support or oppose 
marijuana legalization, roughly one-third from each class favor legalization, with working class 
identifiers 2 percentage points more in favor. As one can see, and in line with my expectations, 
no statistically distinguishable difference exists between class identifiers when evaluating issues 
not tied to economic considerations (p < 0.41; p < 0.74; and p < 0.30 respectively). 
 I now look at these relationships for only objectively working class individuals. I expect 
that class identifiers will have distinct differences. Working class identifiers who are also 
	   28	  
objectively working class should have preferences that differ from objectively working class 
individuals who identify as middle class given the alignment of their objective and subjective 
identification. Restricting my observation to those earning under $30,000 preserves 37% of the 
original sample5. As discussed earlier, one might contest the exact cutoff for what counts as 
objectively working class, but this retains enough sample variation to permit further analysis. 
Importantly, and as we might expect given the relationship between income and class 
identification presented in Figure 1, two-thirds of this sample identifies with the working or 
lower class, with the other third identifying with the middle or upper class. Similarly, roughly 
two-thirds of each income group that comprises the objectively working class ($0-14,999 and 
$15-29,999) identifies as working class.  
As before, working class identifiers are slightly more supportive class of the death 
penalty in the event of murder than those in the middle class, but over 60% of each class displays 
support. Similarly, nothing distinguishes class members in their support for gun permits, with 
84% in favor apiece. The relationship persists for marijuana legalization as well, with roughly 
two-thirds of middle and working class individuals opposing legalization and the other third 
supporting. In this case, limiting the analysis to only those objectively working class does not 
change the nature of the relationships between identification and policy preference. 
 As expected, no meaningful differences existed between class identifiers on social issues 
so I now turn to investigate potential differences between groups on more economic-oriented 
issues. For policies related in some degree to one’s financial position we see the hypothesized 
self-interest relationship borne out across the whole GSS sample. When asked whether it is the 
responsibility of the government to reduce income differences between high-income and low-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  N=1,048 respondents. 687 of these identify with the working/lower class (66%) and 355 identify as middle/upper 
class (34%). 
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income people, some 39% of the working class agreed with the proposition; only 29% of middle 
class respondents voiced support. Likewise, while both classes overwhelmingly responded that 
too little money was being spent on assistance to the poor, working class individuals were 7 
percentage points more likely than middle class identifiers to respond in this way. Much the 
same, when queried about the tax burden the rich should bear, overwhelming majorities in each 
class favored imposing higher taxes on the rich than on the poor—69% and 61% for the working 
and middle class respectively. Again, however, we see the working class displaying much 
stronger support. 
 Whereas the relationships observed for social issues persisted when looking at 
objectively working class individuals alone, the relationships for the economic-oriented issues 
change. Each class had 45% of its members to some extent agree that the government should 
reduce income differentials. Moreover, roughly two-thirds of each class said that too little is 
being spent on aid to the poor; however, the difference between the two groups has narrowed 
from 7 percentage points to a mere 3 and become indistinguishable statistically (p < 0.48). 
Similarly, each class had two-thirds of its identifiers agree that the rich should pay a larger share 
of their income in taxes than the poor, presenting little substantive difference. These preliminary 
results suggests that, counter to my hypothesis, identification does not appear to make a 
significant difference in whether or not an objectively working class individual holds a policy 
preference that aligns with her objective self-interest.  
 
What differentiates working class identifiers? 
We now see that variation exists between class identifiers in various degrees for policies that 
follow from self-interested positions. In contrast, issues that do not directly relate to a self-
interest perspective do not display class-based variation. Additionally, the above results indicate 
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that the impact of class identification on attitudes changes given the level of income, providing 
some evidence that an individual’s objective position may influence how their class identity 
works. We also see that social class may not be a primary influencer of objectively working class 
individuals’ policy preferences. These results suggest that features beyond class identification 
may mitigate the effect of income on policy attitudes. The analysis now turns to examining these 
other factors, some objective and others subjective in nature, and how they may influence 
income’s role in attitude formation and the realization of self-interest more generally. It begins 
by looking at relationships within the entire sample and then determines how these relationships 
change for individuals who are objectively working class. 
 Employment situation seems the obvious place to begin with an examination of other 
factors differentiating working and middle class individuals. Intuitively, if someone has a job 
they may associate the working in “working class” as being employed. For those identifying as 
working class, some 69% work full or part-time, about 8.5 percentage points more than middle 
class identifiers. Working class individuals are nearly 16 percentage points more likely to have 
been unemployed in the last decade than their middle class counterparts, with over one-third of 
identifiers reporting in the affirmative. It’s also possible that working class identifiers may 
perceive their employment situation as more insecure compared to middle class individuals; they 
face some likelihood of losing their job and some difficulty finding an equally good job 
elsewhere. Hinting that this possibility exists, respondents in the working class were 10 
percentage points less likely to say that losing their job was unlikely and 4 percentage points 
more likely to say it would not be easy to find a new job. And when considering the 
remuneration they receive for the skill and effort required for their jobs, two-thirds of working 
class individuals believed their employers compensated them with a less than just amount—a 
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difference of almost 16 percentage points. Intriguingly, while some might speculate that working 
class identification would come more heavily from union members, this group was only slightly 
more likely to have a union member in the household than those in the middle class. Some 55% 
of respondents with at least one union member in the household identified as working class. 
However, with union membership in the United States at 13.5% in 2000, the GSS sample is 
actually 3 percentage points more unionized than the population it represents. 
 Class identification should influence individuals’ interpretations of political and social 
events. We can explore this possibility by seeing if classes differ in their interpretation of 
relevant phenomena. When asked where they would place their family on a scale representing 
society—with 1 being the social top and 7 being the social bottom—some 20% of working class 
identifiers located themselves in the bottom two categories, 16 percentage points more than those 
in the middle class. Moreover, when comparing their financial situation to others, 38% of 
working class individuals responded that they had financial prospects either “below average” or 
“far below average,” a difference of 21 percentage points. In contrast, middle class identifiers 
were almost 29 percentage points more likely to see themselves in relatively above average 
financial situations. Not only do working class individuals locate themselves in a relatively 
inferior financial situation, they are significantly less satisfied with this position than those 
identifying with the middle class. For the working class, 35% were not at all satisfied with their 
financial situation, a difference of 20 percentage points over middle class identifiers. In contrast, 
43% of middle class identifiers were satisfied with their financial situation, a 25 percentage point 
difference over the working class. Taken together, these measures suggest that working class 
individuals will place themselves lower in society with a greater likelihood than those identifying 
with the middle class. In addition, they appear willing to voice dissatisfaction with this position. 
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While these measures contain no information about the force(s) respondents may hold 
responsible for their social position, they do hint at a possibility that these individuals might 
desire that some actor ameliorate their position. 
  We can also see if identifiers differ in their attitudes concerning the broader distribution 
of resources in society. In particular, the General Social Survey presented a subset of respondents 
with a series of five diagrams indicating different types of societies, each with different 
distributions of people at the top, in the middle, and at the bottom. They then asked individuals to 
determine which diagram they thought best represented the United States (see Figure 3). This 
question allows us to tap subjective perceptions about the distribution of advantage in society, 
albeit in a rather crude manner. Working class individuals were 9 percentage points more likely 
to say that types A and B in Figure 3, 22% and 37% respectively, most closely approximated 
society in the United States. As Figure 3 indicates, these society types place large numbers of 
people at the bottom and varying degrees of people in middle and top of society, suggesting 
differing degrees of inequality. In contrast, type D offers the modal response for middle class 
identifiers with 36% of responses. These results suggest that working class individuals perceive 
society as more unequal than middle class identifiers. In contrast, when interviewers followed 
this by inquiring about respondents’ preferred type, both classes overwhelmingly preferred D or 
E, with D edging E by two to one. That substantial difference exists between classes when asked 
about what the United States does look like, but not about what the United States should look 
like, suggests that class identification may influence how individuals perceive their social 
position. Threading this together with responses regarding their subjective location in society, we 
begin to see that working class identifiers may see themselves on the wrong side of a rather 
unequal society. 
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FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
But how do working class individuals understand the inequality they perceive? More 
specifically, do they see inequality as privileging some groups over others? In fact, the GSS 
asked a subset of respondents if they agreed or disagreed with the proposition that inequality 
exists for the benefit of the rich and powerful. Fifty-six percent of working class identifiers 
agreed with this statement, 12 percentage points more than middle class identifiers. In contrast, 
the two groups don’t differ significantly when asked whether pay differences are necessary for 
American prosperity. About 27% of each class agreed with this interpretation. Moreover, beyond 
merely perceiving social features as privileging some individuals or groups over others, 63% of 
working class identifiers affirmed the existence of strong or very strong conflict between the rich 
and poor in the United States, 11 percentage points more than the middle class. Middle class 
identifiers were over 10 percentage points more likely to say that individual effort is rewarded in 
America, with about 70% answering to some degree in the affirmative. Likewise, roughly 79% 
of them agreed that intelligence and skill are rewarded in America, while 69% of working class 
individuals agreed. While majorities of those identifying as working class agreed that skill and 
effort are rewarded, they offer less enthusiastic responses than those in the middle class. Overall, 
while not too large, these differences suggest that working class identification is associated with 
a perception of a less advantageous social position that is a consequence of more than just 
individual activity. 
 Yet this discussion has focused on everyone who identifies as working class, not just 
those who are objectively working class and identify as such. I now turn to exploring variation 
within the objectively working class. Briefly reexamining work status for these individuals, we 
see that the working class identifiers are 25 percentage points more likely to be in the labor force, 
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with 60% employed either full- or part-time. Considering working class individuals’ perceptions 
of job security, while respondents in this subsample view themselves as somewhat more likely to 
lose their job, the difference between working and middle class identifiers is statistically 
indistinguishable. Likewise, the subsample overall views the possibility of finding a new job as 
more difficult, with roughly 33% of working class identifiers replying that it would be easy 
versus 26% for the middle class. Finally, almost two-thirds of working and middle class 
identifiers responded that they received less than just compensation for their work. 
 Even when examining our objectively working class respondents, class identification 
seems associated with perceptions of one’s location in society and evaluations of one’s financial 
situation. When compared to the middle class, working class identifiers were nearly 14 
percentage points more likely to locate their families at or near the bottom of society (i.e. in the 
bottom two categories), 28% to 14%. Moreover, taking into account their relative financial 
situation, over half of working class people, some 55%, placed themselves below average, a 
difference of nearly 13 percentage points. Reinforcing this relative evaluation, roughly 45% of 
those identifying as working class voiced dissatisfaction with their financial situation, compared 
with only 32% of lower income middle class identifiers. While one could potentially think that 
after restricting income to the bottom 40% of the whole sample the evaluations of one’s financial 
situation and position in society would not differ substantially between working and middle class 
identifiers, the above suggest that this is not the case. More than income appears to matter for 
determining one’s position in society. 
 Returning to Figure 3, and evaluations of which diagram best represents society in the 
United States, we don’t see much change when looking solely at the objectively working class. 
Some 23% of the working class respond that type A best characterizes society, while 35% 
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answer type B. In contrast, the middle class responded with 18% and 25% respectively. 
Furthermore, little difference now exists when examining how the respondents in the subsample 
view inequality. Some 45% of each group views inequality as existing to benefit the rich and 
powerful. But as before, both classes don’t differ in their responses when asked if American 
prosperity necessitates inequality. Almost two-thirds of the working class still say posit the 
existence of conflict between the rich and poor in the United States, but the difference between 
them and middle class identifiers decreased to 7 percentage points. In contrast, working and 
middle class individuals still exhibit overwhelming agreement that America rewards effort 
alongside intelligence and skill, with intergroup differences akin to those in the full sample. 
Overall, these results suggest that income alone does not have a significant influence on 
evaluations of society, with substantive differences between class identifiers among the bottom 
two-fifths of the distribution. 
  
Conflict as a Mitigating Factor 
Consider again the myriad factors explaining some inter- and intra-group variation for class 
identifiers: job security, economic reward, personal financial situation, and social conflict. By 
their nature, jobs, the remuneration they offer, and their relation to individuals’ financial 
situation at least intuitively suggest some bearing on individuals’ policy preferences under 
assumptions of self-interest. Conflict, on the other hand, might not. As mentioned earlier, in 
1970s Chile an individual identifying with a class and possessing a conflict image displayed 
greater support for Leftist groups (Langton and Rapoport 1975). In an increasingly unequal 
society, the possibility for perceptions of conflict to mitigate the effect of class identification 
seems at least intuitively plausible. This section expands on this idea, providing a further 
explanation of why conflict should matter both to better ground the analysis theoretically and to 
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offer an examination into how certain contextual factors may influence the relationship between 
class identification and policy preferences.  
 As detailed more fully above, group identification entails the assumption of group 
interests where group members perceive themselves as interdependent (Miller et al. 1981, see 
also Kinder and Kam 2010). Moreover, these feelings of interdependence stem from affective 
and cognitive components stimulating a perspective in support of the group’s interests (Conover 
1988). The group interest’s content follows from the group’s position in society, whether it’s in 
an advantaged or disadvantaged position (Gurin et al. 1980, Miller et al. 1981). But where does 
conflict fit in this tale? A conflict image could compel a group’s identifiers to assume issue 
positions that benefit them while also disadvantaging an opposing out-group. The presence of a 
conflict image might therefore increase the differences in issue preferences between members of 
different groups. As well, a conflict image held by some identifiers in a group and not others 
might increase variation in preferences within the group. 
At the very least, members of a group may have a greater propensity to perceive conflict 
existing in some guise, either between their in-group and an out-group or between the in-group 
and other forces determining its position. Identifiers from one group may blame those from an 
out-group for their objective position. Likewise, those identifying with a disadvantaged group 
may blame some aspect of the social system for their circumstances. How identifiers assign 
blame for their situation likely influences both if they see conflict and the type of conflict that 
exists. For instance, the previous section showed that working class identifiers were less likely to 
agree that effort and skill were rewarded in the United States. They also displayed significantly 
less satisfaction with the compensation they received for their work and were more willing to 
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characterize the distribution of resources in the United States as highly unequal. These examples 
would suggest that working class individuals may have a systemically-oriented conflict image.  
 The intergroup conflict paradigm seems to align best with the literature on ethnocentrism, 
most thoroughly and recently expounded by Kinder and Kam (2010). According to the authors, 
ethnocentrism acts as a standing disposition where individuals favor their in-group and oppose 
out-groups. More specifically, they conceive ethnocentrism as “a readiness to reduce society to 
us and them. Or rather, [as] a readiness to reduce society to us versus them” (2010, 8). This 
disposition comes in degrees, with ethnocentric attitudes made salient through public discourse, 
and more potent for salient topics. 
 How might we evaluate class using the lens ethnocentrism offers? As defined, 
ethnocentrism implies conflict between groups. This suggests that those identifying with one 
class group may perceive other class groups as opposed to their goals. One would identify an 
out-group as prohibiting the realization of their preferred policy options. For example, in the case 
of lower or working class identifiers, their preference for increasing the share of taxes paid by 
the rich would be opposed by middle and upper class identifiers whom a tax increase would 
(potentially) affect. Conversely, middle and upper class identifiers would conceivably be averse 
to reducing income differentials between the rich and poor because their financial position would 
come under assault for the benefit of some other group of people. In the first case, the lower and 
working classes may be perceive their opposites as unjustly possessing the resources they have. 
In the latter case, middle and upper class identifiers may conceive of themselves as having 
earned their rewards, justifying their relatively advantaged position; any redistribution of 
resources to lower and working class people would take away their earned resources to subsidize 
the lives of lower income groups. Ethnocentrism suggests the possibility of perceptions of 
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conflict from both advantaged and disadvantaged groups as the underlying dynamic rests on in-
group favoritism and out-group opposition, rather than on advantage and disadvantage. 
 In contrast to the perception of conflict as between groups, another possibility would 
have individuals see conflict as more systematic in nature. People may see some feature(s) of 
society as contributing to the (dis)advantaged position in which their group exists. Consequently, 
their issue preferences could align with perpetuating or ameliorating the effects of these 
characteristics. For instance, dissatisfaction with one’s work compensation may compel 
individuals to support an increase in the minimum wage, the right to collectively bargain, or 
externally guaranteed retirement benefits. Whether or not identifiers perceive conflict, and where 
they locate it, could reasonably suggest differences in policy preferences. 
 
Modeling the Class Effect 
 
Objective Class Influence 
Following the brief discussion of what factors differentiate working and middle class identifiers, 
we now examine whether class identification has an effect on policy preferences beyond the 
contribution socioeconomic status makes. Given the ordinal nature of my dependent variable, 
rather than using OLS regression analysis I will use ordered logistic regression models to 
examine my hypothesized relationships. To ease the comprehension of the various models, I will 
present example cases to display the effects of my key explanatory variables and contrast them 
with other factors known to be strong predictors of policy: partisanship and ideology. Each are 
measured on the standard 7-point scales, where 1 signifies strong Democrat or very liberal and 7 
indicates strong Republican or very conservative. I also control for demographic variables, 
including dummies for gender, where 1 indicates female, and race, where 1 indicates white, and 
a continuous measure for age. 
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For this examination I attempt to explain variation in support for government action to 
equalize incomes. The dependent variable comes from the following question: “It is the 
responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes.” Responses were recorded on a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 
indicating “strongly agree” and 5 noting “strongly disagree. ” I use this over other policy options 
mentioned earlier for one key reason: reducing income differences between the rich and poor 
seems more relevant to an individual’s self-interest than either aid to the poor or the share of 
taxes paid by the rich. If no preference differences exist between working and middle class 
identifiers when using this dependent variable then I would not expect significant differences 
between class groups on other, less directly relevant policies6. 
Opposing the self-interest as dominant argument is the contention that self-interest exerts 
little influence on mass policy preferences. This symbolic politics argument contends, rather, that 
attitudes are predominately shaped by intangible concerns like racism and ideology. Examining 
Bostonian whites’ opposition to busing, Green and Cowden (1992) further complicate this 
relationship. They find that while self-interest did not affect public opinion, it did influence 
patterns of anti-busing behavior. The lessons from the symbolic politics literature suggest that 
any differences in class identifiers’ policy preferences potentially attributable to self-interest 
would therefore carry greater substantive meaning. 
I first examine the typical model for class effects presented in political science. Again, 
the usual measure of this influence is socioeconomic status, what I have referred to as objective 
class membership. Model 1 in Table 2 shows that objective membership has a statistically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The correlation between this policy and aid to the poor is 0.25, with the tax share paid by the rich is 0.36, and the 
government intervention to solve national problems is 0.38. In contrast, its correlation with background checks on 
guns is 0.14, marijuana legalization is 0.07, and the death penalty in the event of murder is -0.16. 
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significant effect on our dependent variable, after controlling for other factors. Increasing income 
decreases the likelihood one agrees with the income equalization policy. 
To highlight the substantive effects, I set all explanatory variables at their means, except 
for the dummies that I place at their modal categories. This white female has an income of about 
$30-35,000, is a moderate Independent, and is 45 years old. As Figure 4.1.1 shows, this 
“average” person overall has a 0.29 probability of agreeing that the government should reduce 
income differences. However, there is a 0.42 probability she disagrees to some degree. Keeping 
these same factors and moving between a person with an income one standard deviation below 
its mean ($12,500 —14,999) to one with a person with income one standard deviation above 
($75 – 89,999) decreases the probability of agreeing by 0.18 and increases the probability of 
disagreeing by 0.17. Figure 4.1.2 shows this graphically. Clearly, income has a substantively 
meaningful effect explaining variation in support for government action to equalize incomes. 
 
 
Figure 4.1.1 – All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. White, 45 years 
old, female, income $30-35,000, moderate, Independent. 
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FIGURE 4.1.2 HERE 
 
How does income’s effect compare to other strong predictors of attitudes: partisanship 
and ideology? I use the same individual as before, and set income back at its mean. Figure 4.1.3 
shows how the probabilities of agreeing and disagreeing change when varying ideology and 
partisanship. Between a Democrat and a Republican the change in the probability one agrees is 
0.15. The same change between a liberal and a conservative, is 0.21. Figures 4.1.4 and 4.1.5 
show the influence of broader changes in partisanship and ideology. When compared to the 
effects of partisanship and ideology, income appears to have an important influence on the 
likelihood an individual would want the government to reduce income differences. 
 
 
Figure 4.1.3 — All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. White, 45 years 
old, female, income $30-35,000, moderate, Independent. 
 
FIGURES 4.1.4 and 4.1.5 HERE 
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My core hypothesis is that class identification will be a significant and substantively meaningful 
explainer of policy preferences beyond that of income. Moreover, income’s effect should 
decrease with the inclusion of class identification into the regression model. This expectation 
follows from class identification acting in some fashion as an intervening variable where some 
influence of objective membership should be captured through the inclusion of class 
identification. As Model 2 in Table 2 indicates, working class identification and income have 
statistically significant effects. Both objective membership and subjective identification are 
therefore significant explainers of individuals’ preferences for our dependent variable. 
To evaluate the effect of class identification I again set each variable to its mean, 
recreating our average individual from the previous section: a white female with an income of 
$30-35,000, who is a moderate Independent and is 45 years old. As Figure 4.2.1 shows, a middle 
class individual would have a 0.26 probability of agreeing with the proposition that government 
should reduce income differences between the rich and poor. She would also have a 0.45 
probability of disagreeing with the statement. In contrast, someone otherwise identical but 
identifying as working class has a probability of agreeing 0.07 greater than the middle class 
identifier. The difference between working and middle class identifiers is substantively as well as 
statistically significant. 
Yet, does the effect of income change after including class identification? To determine 
this I repeat the procedure by offering example individuals with incomes one standard deviation 
below the mean and one standard deviation above the mean in Figure 4.2.1, as well as more 
general changes in Figure 4.2.2. This change in income decreases the probability of agreeing by 
0.14. Income retains a substantively meaningful effect, but the magnitude of its influence has 
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decreased. Following the introduction of class identification into the model, income’s 
contribution diminished as expected. 
 
 
Figure 4.2.1 – All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. Middle class, 
white, 45 years old, female, income $30-35,000, moderate, Independent. 
 
FIGURE 4.2.2 
 
I now compare the effect of objective membership and class identification to partisanship 
and ideology, as I did earlier when looking at income alone. Figure 4.2.3 shows these 
comparisons. The difference between Democrats and Republicans in the probability either 
support a reduction in income differences is 0.13. Between a liberal and a conservative, the 
probability one agrees decreases by 0.20. Figures 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 show the changes in probability 
of agreeing or disagreeing when varying partisanship and ideology across their range. 
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Figure 4.2.3 — All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. Middle class, 
white, 45 years old, female, income $30-35,000, moderate, Independent. 
 
FIGURES 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 HERE 
 
How does class identification’s effect compare? Placed into this fuller context, for Model 
2 the probability difference between class identifiers is about half that for a change in party 
identification. Likewise, it’s about a third that realized from a substantial shift in ideology. This 
is a strong effect, particularly considering that income and class identification also have indirect 
effects through partisanship and ideology.  
As well, the difference in predicted probabilities for working class and middle class 
identifiers amounts to half of the effect realized by a dramatic change in income. As expected, 
the effect of income diminished after the introduction of class identification. The results from 
this model alone suggest that omitting class identification from an analysis of policy preferences 
omits some of the nuance necessary for understanding the influence of individuals’ group 
identification on their attitudes. 
 
!"#$%
!"&'%
!"#(%
!"&)%
!"!*%
!"!$%
!"&!%
!"!)%
!"#'%
!"+$%
!"#)%
!"+'%
!"&&%
!"#!%
!"!*%
!"##%
!"!!%
!"&!%
!"#!%
!"+!%
!")!%
!"$!%
!"'!%
!",!%
-./01234% 5.6789:13;% <:8.239% =0;>.2?3@?.% -./01234% 5.6789:13;% <:8.239% =0;>.2?3@?.%
!"#$%&'()*)+'''
,%-./."0"12'3"4&%&56&7'.&18&&5''
,/%97/57'/5:';:&-0-#$&7'
A20838:9:4BCDE2..F% A20838:9:4BCG420;E9B%DE2..F%
A20838:9:4BC-:>3E2..F% A20838:9:4BCG420;E9B%-:>3E2..F%
	   45	  
Mitigating Variables: Intergroup Conflict 
I now turn to an examination of how mitigating variables may influence this relationship. 
Specifically, I explore the variables discussed above that measure social conflict. For my 
measure of intergroup conflict I use the following question: “In all countries, there are 
differences or conflicts between different social groups. In your opinion, in America, how much 
conflict is there between poor people and rich people?” Responses ranged from 1—very strong 
conflict—to 4—no conflict. Regardless of their class identification, I expect that those who agree 
that conflict between the poor and rich exists in society will be more likely to agree that 
government should reduce income differences. Moreover, this effect should be greater for 
working class identifiers than for middle class identifiers. I expect that perceiving conflict 
between one’s in-group and an out-group would promote a desire for a third party authority, in 
this case government, to intervene to ameliorate the situation. Therefore, those perceiving 
conflict should be more supportive of government action to reduce income differences. 
I first explore the consequences that result after adding the intergroup conflict measure. 
As Model 3 in Table 2 shows, both working class identification and objective membership 
remain significant. Given its ordinal nature, I reconstructed the 4-category conflict variable into 
four dummy variables. When compared to the omitted category—not strong conflict—both very 
strong conflict and strong conflict are highly statistically significant. Moreover, they have 
statistically distinguishable influences on the dependent variable. 
To look at the influence of income I set each conflict dummy to 0, indicating the 
individual sees “not strong conflict” between rich people and poor people in the United States. 
As Figure 4.3.1 shows, a middle class individual has a 0.22 probability of agreeing that 
government should reduce income differences. The difference in probabilities between middle 
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class and working class identifiers is 0.07. We see that the inclusion of intergroup conflict did 
not affect the magnitude of the difference between class identifiers.  
To evaluate the effect of income for this model I again examine the effect of a change 
from one standard deviation below income’s mean to one standard deviation above its mean. As 
Figure 4.3.1 shows, the probability difference between these two individuals is 0.10. We see that 
the inclusion of this mitigating variable decreases the contribution of income in the model. More 
importantly, class identification’s effect has increased relative to that of income given the new 
model specification. Figure 4.3.2 shows this effect graphically while also exhibiting the 
difference between working and middle class identifiers. 
 
 
Figure 4.3.1 — All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. Middle class, see 
“not very strong conflict” between rich and poor, white, 45 years old, female, income $30-35,000, moderate, 
Independent. 
 
FIGURE 4.3.2 
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Turning to intergroup conflict, we see substantial differences if we change the degree of 
conflict someone perceives for both middle and working class identifiers. As Figure 4.3.3 shows, 
a middle class person who sees “not very strong” conflict to one seeing “strong conflict” has a 
0.07 increase in the probability she agrees that the government should reduce income 
differences. For those seeing “very strong” conflict, the difference in probabilities between these 
middle class individuals increases from 0.07 to 0.21.  
Beyond comparing individuals identifying with the same class who have different 
conflict frames, we can also contrast individuals with the same conflict frame but who identify 
with different classes. As Figures 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 suggest, for two individuals seeing not strong 
conflict, the difference in the probability of agreeing between middle and working class 
identifiers is 0.08. For strong conflict, the magnitude of a change between middle and working 
class increases to 0.09. It appears, then, that for a given conflict frame the size of the difference 
between working class and middle class identifiers will increase, suggesting that intergroup 
conflict does influence the effect of class identification. 
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Figure 4.3.3 — All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. Middle class, see 
“not very strong conflict” between rich and poor, white, 45 years old, female, income $30-35,000, moderate, 
Independent. 
 
FIGURE 4.3.4 HERE 
 
How do the effects of income, class identification, and intergroup conflict compare to 
partisanship and ideology in this model? Figure 4.3.5 shows the differences between a Democrat 
and a Republican as well as a liberal and a conservative. For the former pair, such a change 
decreases the probability of agreeing by 0.11. Similarly, the difference in probabilities between 
the latter two amounts to 0.20. Figures 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 show these changes across all degrees of 
partisanship or ideology. 
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Figure 4.3.5 — All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. Middle class, see 
“not very strong conflict” between rich and poor, white, 45 years old, female, income $30-35,000, moderate, 
Independent. 
 
FIGURES 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 HERE 
 
As Figures 4.3.5, 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 indicate, substantial changes in party identification and 
ideology would have significant effects on our dependent variable. The difference between 
classes is over half that between partisans and about one-third that between ideologues, results 
similar to Model 2. These comparisons suggest that, as hypothesized, class identification has an 
important influence on policy preferences beyond that offered by objective membership alone. 
Moreover, the relative effect of class identification changes with the presence of mitigating 
factors, in this case changing according to the presence and degree of intergroup conflict. 
Therefore, it appears that at least in this case intergroup conflict helps explain inter-class 
differences in attitudes. 
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I now examine what effect systemic conflict may have in explaining intergroup preference 
differences. To measure systemic conflict I use the following question: “Do you agree or 
disagree that inequality continues to exist because it benefits the rich and powerful.” Responses 
ranged from 1 to 5, or strongly agree to strongly disagree. I expect that individuals who agree 
that inequality benefits the rich and powerful will be more likely to agree that government should 
reduce income differences between the rich and power. I also expect that these differences will 
be greater for working class individuals than for middle class individuals given their relatively 
disadvantaged social position. Agreeing that inequality benefits advantaged groups should 
prompt working class identifiers to prefer policy outcomes that address this situation. 
Model 5 in Table 2 indicates that after including the measures for perceiving systemic 
conflict both class identification and objective membership remain significant, though 
identification remains so barely. This decrease in significance could come from systemic conflict 
resulting from class identification. As with the measure for intergroup conflict, I turn the 5-
category ordinal systemic conflict variable into a collection of 5 dummies, omitting the dummy 
indicating “neither agree nor disagree.” As with Model 3, the variables indicating perceptions of 
greater degrees of systemic conflict are statistically distinguishable both from this base category 
and from each other. 
As before, I begin with a look at how changes in objective membership and class 
identification influence the chance an individual agrees or disagrees that government should 
reduce income differences between the rich and poor. Figure 4.4.1 presents these results. To our 
example individual, we add that she “neither agrees nor disagrees that inequality exists to benefit 
the rich and powerful.” Consider the middle class example. She has a 0.28 probability of 
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agreeing government should reduce income differences between rich people and poor people. In 
contrast, a working class individual’s probability of agreeing would increase to 0.34. 
Also in Figure 4.4.1 we see that moving from one standard deviation below to one 
standard deviation above income’s mean decreases the probability of agreeing by 0.10. When 
compared to objective membership, it appears that class identification maintains its influence 
when considering systemic conflict. Yet, instead of a greater difference between classes in the 
presence of conflict like that realized with the intergroup conflict measure, accounting for 
perceptions of systemic conflict appears to reduce the absolute magnitude of interclass 
differences. Even so, class identification maintains its relative size advantage compared to 
changes in income from the mean to a standard deviation below (0.05) or above (0.04). 
Furthermore, the initial probability of agreeing is greater than that observed in the intergroup 
conflict case. Figure 4.4.2 shows the difference between identifiers for all income categories 
within a standard deviation of the mean. 
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Figure 4.4.1 All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. Middle class, 
“neither agree nor disagree” inequality benefits the rich and powerful, white, 45 years old, female, income $30-
35,000, moderate, Independent. 
 
FIGURE 4.4.2 HERE 
 
As with the evaluation of intergroup conflict, I consider differences within class groups 
for identifiers with different attitudes about inequality. Likewise, I consider differences between 
class groups for individuals with the same attitudes about inequality, or systemic conflict frame. 
Examples for both of these evaluations are presented in Figure 4.4.3. For a middle class 
identifier, “agreeing” that inequality benefits the rich and powerful increases the probability that 
she agrees government should reduce income differences by 0.08. For her working class 
counterpart, the increase in probability is 0.10. For those “agreeing” inequality benefits the rich 
and powerful, the difference in probability between class identifiers is then 0.07. These changes 
are also presented in Figure 4.4.4. 
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Figure 4.4.3 — All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. Middle class, 
“neither agree nor disagree” inequality benefits the rich and powerful, white, 45 years old, female, income $30-
35,000, moderate, Independent. 
 
FIGURE 4.4.4 HERE 
 
Again, I turn to comparing the effects of objective membership, class identification, and 
systemic conflict with partisanship and ideology. To compare the effect of party identification 
we can look at the examples presented in Figure 4.4.5. The probability of agreeing decreases by 
0.11 between Democratic identification and Republican identification. The probability of 
agreeing decreases by 0.20 between a liberal and a conservative. Figures 4.4.6 and 4.4.7 show 
the effects of changes along the range of partisanship and ideology. 
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While less substantial when compared to the intergroup conflict exploration, the effect of 
class identification is still comparable to reasonable changes in ideology and partisanship. These 
results continue to suggest that class identification, even controlling for a range of demographic 
and attitudinal variables, helps explain variation in policy preferences beyond the attitudes 
indicated by objective membership alone.  
 
Figure 4.4.5 — All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. Middle class, 
“neither agree nor disagree” inequality benefits the rich and powerful, white, 45 years old, female, income $30-
35,000, moderate, Independent. 
 
FIGURES 4.4.6 and 4.4.7 HERE 
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We’ve now seen that the difference between class groups remains the same after accounting for 
intergroup conflict and decreases  in the systemic conflict formulation. It could also be that either 
type of conflict could differentiate individuals within class groups as well. It is to this possibility 
I now turn. Models 4 and 6 in Table 2 show the effect of interacting the intergroup and systemic 
conflict measures with class identification. With none of the interaction terms achieving 
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statistical significance we cannot say anything about the within-group influence either type of 
conflict may have. However, including the interaction terms does change the model 
specification; therefore, exploring the effect class identification and conflict frames have may 
still be substantively useful. 
 In an interaction model the constituent components of the interaction term(s) are 
evaluated as the absence of the conditioning variable. For example, when determining the effect 
of class identification for Models 4 and 6 we evaluate the effect of class for an individual with a 
conflict frame indicated by the omitted category for each conflict variable. Take Model 4 and 
consider an individual seeing not strong conflict between rich people and poor people. Figure 
4.5.1 shows that the difference in support for reducing income differentials of identifying as 
working class versus middle class is 0.09. We can also explore changes in income using both 
Figure 4.5.1 and 4.5.2. The difference in support for reducing income differentials between 
someone with an income one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation 
above is 0.09. In relation to class identification, we see that after including the interaction terms, 
in essence controlling for intra-group variation given the model specification, the differences 
between class identifiers increase both absolutely and in relation to objective membership. 
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Figure 4.5.1 — All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. Middle class, see 
“not very strong conflict” between rich and poor, white, 45 years old, female, income $30-35,000, moderate, 
Independent. 
 
FIGURE 4.5.2 HERE 
 
 Because two of the three included conflict terms are also significant we can also evaluate 
how changes in a middle class identifier’s conflict frame affect her probability of agreeing. In 
Figure 4.5.3 we see that seeing strong conflict increases the probability she supports reducing 
income differentials by 0.07. If she sees very strong conflict, the increase in probability is 0.37. 
Compared to the additive formulation in Model 3, the effect of conflict for middle class 
individuals increases marginally in Model 5’s interaction version. 
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Figure 4.5.3 — All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. Middle class, see 
“not very strong conflict” between rich and poor, white, 45 years old, female, income $30-35,000, moderate, 
Independent. 
 
 I now compare these effects to changes in partisanship and ideology. In Figure 4.5.4 we 
see that identifying as a Republican rather than as a Democrat decreases the probability of 
agreeing by 0.11. We also see that the probability difference between a liberal and a conservative 
is 0.19. Figures 4.5.5 and 4.5.6 show the variation in the probability of agreeing for each degree 
of partisanship and ideology. The examples in Figures 4.5.4-6 show that for Model 4, the effects 
for changes in party identification and ideology are about the same as in Model 3. But more 
importantly, the effect of class identification increases while that for objective membership 
decreases after including the interaction terms. While no statistically distinguishable effects exist 
within class groups for individuals with a given conflict frame, by modeling that possibility the 
new model specification suggests an increase in the substantive effect for class identification. 
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Figure 4.5.4 — All individuals have parameters set at sample averages unless otherwise specified. Middle class, see 
“not very strong conflict” between rich and poor, white, 45 years old, female, income $30-35,000, moderate, 
Independent. 
 
FIGURES 4.5.5 AND 4.5.6 HERE 
 
Modeling the Objectively Working Class 
We can conduct the same analysis but restrict our examination to only the objectively working 
class. In so doing we can evaluate the effect class identification has for these individuals and see 
whether it helps lower income individuals take policy positions in line with their objective self-
interest. Since there is variation in identification for this objective group, we might reasonably 
expect to find that working class identifiers again have statistically significant differences in their 
support for government intervention to reduce income differences between high-income and 
low-income individuals in the United States. 
 The results displayed in Table 3 offer an interesting story. Regardless of the model 
specification and the inclusion of the conflict measures, contrary to my hypotheses neither 
income nor class identification achieve statistical significance. These results are similar to the 
findings from the cross-tabulation results presented earlier. At least in this tale, partisanship and 
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ideology drive preference formation for the objectively working class. While not presented here, 
the estimated effects for changes in party identification and ideology are similar to those for the 
models in Table 2. 
 
Conclusions 
Following this investigation, we see that class identification does play an important role in 
explaining individuals’ preferences on a policy that is highly relevant to an individual’s self-
interest. As expected, working class identifiers were more supportive of government reducing 
income differences between high- and low-income individuals. Objective class membership, 
measured by family income, remained significant throughout. More importantly, the effect of 
objective membership diminished after including class identification as expected. Finally, the 
inclusion of mitigating factors—measures of intergroup and systemic conflict—marginally 
changed the relative impact for class identification. Substantively, a change in identification 
between class groups was comparable to reasonable changes in partisanship, ideology, and 
objective class membership. For this case, class identification appears to have a substantively 
meaningful influence on individuals’ policy preferences. 
 The interesting counterpoint comes after restricting the analysis from the whole General 
Social Survey sample to only the objectively working class. Against expectations, for those 
earning under $30,000, neither objective membership nor class identification significantly 
explained variation in the dependent variable. These results suggest that these factors did not 
help low-income individuals take policy preferences in line with their self-interest. Instead, these 
individuals appear to rely on ideology and partisanship given the models used. 
 What explains objective membership and class identification’s non-contribution? One 
possibility, mentioned earlier, comes from the large literature on symbolic politics. According to 
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scholars working within this framework, self-interest has little impact on individuals’ attitudes 
(Green and Cowden 1992). Instead, the literature contends that opinions are largely shaped by 
concerns like racism and broad preferences for tolerance and equality (Bobo 1983, Green and 
Cowden 1992). The symbolism involved in a policy like busing for integration trumps the 
possibility that individuals susceptible to busing’s effects—i.e. those with school-aged 
children—have distinctly different preferences than those not affected (Green and Cowden 
1992). The results presented in Table 3 suggest that symbolic concerns potentially play a greater 
role for objectively working class individuals than do factors that would have them hold more 
self-interested policy preferences. While I remain agnostic to the exact considerations—
preferences for fairness, concerns for their class group—the results suggest that symbolic 
concerns may shape the preferences of low-income individuals. 
 Class identity may also not have been salient for these individuals in 2000. A salient 
group identity increases the influence the group has on identifiers’ behavior and attitudes 
(Conover 1984, Koch 1994, Lau 1989). The lack of a distinction along class lines for the 
objectively working class may suggest a lack of group salience for these individuals. While the 
objectively working class were more likely to place themselves at the bottom of society, it could 
be that these individuals felt they alone were not gaining ground financially. Lacking a sense of 
interdependence with others in similar objective positions would decrease the significance of 
group identification (Miller et al. 1981). With the economy growing to some degree, individuals 
may have felt few others shared their personal situation or that it was still up to them to make 
ends meet, consequently decreasing any sense of collective fate (see generally Ehrenreich 2001) 
 
Further Research 
	   61	  
These new questions offer interesting avenues for further research. Collecting new survey data 
on individuals’ class identification, as well as their attitudes towards inequality and social 
conflict, would allow us to test the analyzed relationships in a different context. Evidence from 
surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2011 and 2012 suggests potentially interesting 
changes. One survey from July 2012 showed 31% of respondents identifying as lower class, a 7 
percentage point increase from 2008 (Morin and Motel 2012). During the same time period, 
middle and upper class identification dropped 4 points to 49% and 17% respectively. Although 
not comparable to the GSS data because of question wording—e.g. the Pew question lacks a 
working class option—the temporal change displayed by the Pew data suggest that the time 
period saw some shift in individuals’ class identification. Another survey, fielded in December 
2011, found that two-thirds of respondents saw “strong” or “very strong” conflict between the 
rich and the poor, a 19 point increase from 2009 (Morin 2012). According to Pew, this was the 
“largest share expressing this opinion since the question was first asked in 1987” (Morin 2012, 
1). While the conflict question came quite close to that used in the General Social Survey, 
question wording differences prevent any comparisons between the two. What these data 
suggest, however, is that collecting new data using the GSS questions could be a fruitful 
endeavor.  
 Further research could attempt to test individual-level dynamics through experimental 
manipulations. Experimental designs could be used to explore factors contributing to the salience 
of class identification. Likewise, they could ascertain the degree to which elite discourse affects 
individuals’ perceptions of conflict (see Kinder and Kam 2010). Experiments would also offer 
the opportunity to provide participants with factual knowledge about the distribution of resources 
in the United States and test, via permutations of this provided information, how attitudes about 
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system legitimacy change. We could then evaluate the degree to which social class identification 
becomes salient either from assessments of system legitimacy or as a consequence of elite 
discourse. Data collected from such experiments would surely complement that provided by new 
survey research. 
More work remains to determine which factors differentiate class identifiers both within 
and between groups. A clearer understanding of what contextual and individual-level factors 
prompt individuals to take self-interested policy preferences, if they do so at all, is important not 
only for academics but for policymakers and the public as well. Improving our understanding of 
group identifiers’ attitudes would help clarify the concerns of distinct social entities. This would 
allow us to more explicitly highlight the degree to which politicians respond to the concerns of 
their constituents, especially those facing economic hardships. 
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Figure 1 — Income divided into quintiles except for $110,000+ category which is 7% of sample. 
 
 
Figure 2 — Class identification by Erikson-Goldthorpe class schema category 
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Figure 3 — “What type of society is America today - which diagram comes closest?” 
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Figure 4.1.2 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when varying income from one 
standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. 
 
 
Figure 4.1.4 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when changing party 
identification. 1 = Strong Democrat; 7 = Strong Republican 
 
 
.15
.1
5
2
.2
.2
5
3
.3
.3
5
10
10
21
21
Total Family Income
Total Family Income
Probability(agree)=Pr(2)
Probability(agree)=Pr(2)
disagre )=Pr(4)
Probability(disagree)=Pr(4)
.15
.1
5
2
.2
.2
5
3
.3
.3
5
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
Party Identification
Party Identification
robability(agree)=Pr(2)
Probability(agree)=Pr(2)
dis gree)=Pr(4)
Probability(disagree)=Pr(4)
	   71	  
 
Figure 4.1.5 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when changing ideology.  
1 = Very Liberal; 7 = Very Conservative 
 
Figure 4.2.2 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when varying income by class 
from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. Middle class is blue 
and green. Working class is red and orange. 
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Figure 4.2.4 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when changing party 
identification. 1 = Strong Democrat; 7 = Strong Republican 
 
Figure 4.2.5 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when changing ideology.  
1 = Very Liberal; 7 = Very Conservative 
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Figure 4.3.2 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when varying income by class 
from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. Middle class is blue 
and green. Working class is red and orange. 
 
Figure 4.3.4 — Difference in probabilities by class between seeing “not strong conflict” and 
“strong conflict” between the rich and the poor. Middle class is blue and green. Working class is 
red and orange. 
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Figure 4.3.6 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when changing party 
identification. 1 = Strong Democrat; 7 = Strong Republican 
 
Figure 4.3.7 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when changing ideology.  
1 = Very Liberal; 7 = Very Conservative 
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Figure 4.4.2 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when varying income by class 
from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. Middle class is blue 
and green. Working class is red and orange. 
 
Figure 4.4.4 — Difference in probabilities between “agree” and “neither agree nor disagree” 
inequality benefits rich and powerful. Middle class is blue and green. Working class is red and 
orange.  
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Figure 4.4.6 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when changing party 
identification. 1 = Strong Democrat; 7 = Strong Republican 
 
Figure 4.4.7 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when changing ideology.  
1 = Very Liberal; 7 = Very Conservative 
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Figure 4.5.2 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when varying income by class 
from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above. Middle class is blue 
and green. Working class is red and orange.  
 
Figure 4.5.5 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when changing party 
identification. 1 = Strong Democrat; 7 = Strong Republican 
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Figure 4.5.6 — Change in probability of agreeing or disagreeing when changing ideology.  
1 = Very Liberal; 7 = Very Conservative 
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Table 2 — Should the government reduce income differences between high-income and low-
income people? Ordered logistic regression. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
        
 Working Class (WC)  -0.293*** -0.357*** -0.527*** -0.259* -0.32 
   (0.089) (0.13) (0.194) (0.132) (0.213) 
 Income 0.073*** 0.065*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Inter-
group Very Strong Conflict   -1.368*** -1.663***  
Conflict    (0.249) (0.373)   
 Strong Conflict   -0.384*** -0.535***  
    (0.129) (0.178)   
 No Conflict   -0.247 0.096   
    (0.44) (0.504)   
 WC*Very Strong Conflict   0.517   
     (0.481)   
 WC*Strong Conflict    0.297   
     (0.255)   
 WC*No Conflict    -1.24   
     (0.997)   
Systemic Strongly Agree     -0.954*** -1.263*** 
Conflict      (0.239) (0.395) 
 Agree     -0.369** -0.336* 
      (0.144) (0.2) 
 Disagree     0.749*** 0.676*** 
      (0.188) (0.235) 
 Strongly Disagree     1.883*** 1.854*** 
      (0.44) (0.438) 
 WC*Strongly Agree      0.504 
       (0.483) 
 WC*Agree      -0.064 
       (0.278) 
 WC*Disagree      0.17 
       (0.371) 
 WC*Strongly Disagree      0.043 
       (1.395) 
 Ideology 0.258*** 0.263*** 0.295*** 0.287*** 0.249*** 0.247*** 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
 Partisanship 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.136*** 0.137*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
 Age 0.007*** 0.006** 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Female -0.183** -0.193** -0.13 -0.133 -0.267** -0.276** 
  (0.084) (0.084) (0.126) (0.127) (0.126) (0.126) 
 White 0.510*** 0.490*** 0.338** 0.345** 0.360** 0.362** 
  (0.109) (0.109) (0.171) (0.171) (0.162) (0.163) 
cut1 Constant 1.011*** 0.686*** 0.1 -0.034 -0.224 -0.262 
  (0.233) (0.262) (0.389) (0.402) (0.4) (0.412) 
	   80	  
cut2 Constant 2.691*** 2.366*** 1.788*** 1.660*** 1.412*** 1.376*** 
  (0.238) (0.267) (0.392) (0.403) (0.399) (0.411) 
cut3 Constant 3.881*** 3.560*** 2.987*** 2.864*** 2.656*** 2.622*** 
  (0.247) (0.274) (0.403) (0.413) (0.403) (0.415) 
cut4 Constant 5.451*** 5.146*** 4.587*** 4.471*** 4.382*** 4.349*** 
  (0.261) (0.285) (0.418) (0.427) (0.412) (0.422) 
        
 Observations 1,956 1,950 889 889 924 924 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table 3 - Should the government reduce income differences between high-income and low-
income people? Individuals earning under $30,000 only. Ordered logistic regression. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
        
 Working Class (WC)  -0.034 0.033 -0.42 0.036 -0.339 
   (0.142) (0.201) (0.338) (0.207) (0.383) 
 Income 0.028 0.028 -0.008 -0.011 0.003 0.005 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) 
Inter-
group Very Strong Conflict   -1.431*** -2.187***   
Conflict    (0.342) (0.487)   
 Strong Conflict   -0.419** -0.938**   
    (0.212) (0.385)   
 No Conflict   -0.92 -0.362   
    (0.691) (0.601)   
 WC*Very Strong Conflict    1.132*   
     (0.637)   
 WC*Strong Conflict    0.759*   
     (0.452)   
 WC*No Conflict    -1.498   
     (1.08)   
Systemic Strongly Agree     -0.933*** -1.568*** 
Conflict      (0.337) (0.576) 
 Agree     -0.448** -0.679* 
      (0.227) (0.411) 
 Disagree     0.797** 0.22 
      (0.329) (0.561) 
 Strongly Disagree     1.964 3.144* 
      (1.563) (1.771) 
 WC*Strongly Agree      0.928 
       (0.699) 
 WC*Agree      0.307 
       (0.483) 
 WC*Disagree      0.903 
       (0.678) 
 WC*Strongly Disagree      -2.327 
       (2.859) 
 Ideology 0.185*** 0.186*** 0.240*** 0.232*** 0.232*** 0.237*** 
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.08) (0.082) (0.079) (0.08) 
 Partisanship 0.140*** 0.142*** 0.140** 0.148** 0.122** 0.127** 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) 
 Age 0.002 0.002 0 0 -0.004 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 Female -0.330** -0.323** -0.12 -0.09 -0.291 -0.301 
  (0.137) (0.137) (0.209) (0.213) (0.209) (0.212) 
 White 0.473*** 0.462*** 0.316 0.308 0.306 0.333 
  (0.157) (0.158) (0.234) (0.235) (0.235) (0.237) 
cut1 Constant -0.083 -0.095 -0.718 -1.061* -0.748 -0.943 
  (0.342) (0.362) (0.579) (0.632) (0.607) (0.641) 
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cut2 Constant 1.467*** 1.456*** 0.864 0.553 0.81 0.623 
  (0.343) (0.365) (0.57) (0.617) (0.595) (0.63) 
cut3 Constant 2.598*** 2.585*** 2.053*** 1.764*** 2. 038*** 1.856*** 
  (0.349) (0.371) (0.574) (0.615) (0.594) (0.628) 
cut4 Constant 4.062*** 4.058*** 3.717*** 3.442*** 3.704*** 3.545*** 
  (0.36) (0.38) (0.585) (0.618) (0.595) (0.627) 
        
 Observations 797 795 355 355 367 367 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
 
 
